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Introduction


Human rights belong to individuals in virtue of their common humanity. Yet it is an important question whether human rights entail or comport with the possession of what I call group-specific rights (sometimes referred to as collective rights), or rights that individuals possess only because they belong to a particular group. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) says they do. Article 15 asserts the right to nationality, or citizenship. Unless one believes that the only citizenship compatible with a universal human rights regime is cosmopolitan citizenship in a world state – a conception of citizenship that is not countenanced by the UDHR – one must interpret the human right to citizenship as a universal right to a particular group right.

Other UN Conventions affirm the right of national minorities and indigenous people to cultural autonomy.​[1]​ In these cases the right attributed to the group is understood as protecting an individually held human right to freedom of religion, association, or cultural expression. Because these individual rights are exercised collectively (as a social practice) and exclusively (by members of a particular group only), they ensure that individual members of a particular group have the freedom to act (worship, associate, express themselves culturally) unhindered by outsiders.
	 However, groups often view their right to freedom of religion, association, and cultural expression in an entirely different way. Not only do they wish that their individual members be free from outside interference (free in the negative sense) but they wish to be freely self-determining as a group (free in the positive sense).   That is, they wish to collectively define their own identity, including the identity of their individual members, according to the dominant views of the majority. This right to collective self-determination entitles a group to limit the full exercise of its members’ human right to act as they wish whenever the group determines that this exercise endangers the identity of the group. In these cases, the internal threat to the group’s cultural identity posed by the heterodox practices of its own members appears to be indistinguishable from the external threat to the group’s cultural autonomy posed by outsiders.  

I shall argue that groups are sometimes morally entitled to limit (but not suspend) the exercise of their members' human rights under certain conditions.​[2]​ In some respects the notion of limitation operant here is familiar to us from our own understanding of what liberal democratic societies legitimately demand of their citizens. No right – human or otherwise – is exercised unconditionally, since rights sometimes conflict with one another and their possession is contingent upon respecting the rights of others, which normally involves accepting some limitations on what may be said or done. Laws merely codify how the majority understands these limits. Also, many philosophers have argued that the meaning of human rights is far from settled, so that even a liberal democratic interpretation of rights of the sort that is contained in the first article of the UDHR is far from being universally accepted.​[3]​  Leaving aside the possibility that human rights do not entail the extensive liberty associated with a liberal understanding of them,​[4]​ I shall argue that groups can sometimes be morally justified (and not merely legally entitled) to limit the expressive liberty of their individual members so long as they are both ontologically and morally legitimate and provide dissenters with reasonable opportunities for exit.

A Brief History of Group Rights

Although the philosophical debate on group rights is relatively new, the concept itself is quite ancient. In pre-modern societies it was not unusual for persons to enjoy special privileges (freedoms) or carry special burdens depending on their membership in a particular class or group. Indeed, this was the norm rather than the exception: different standards of licit (or illicit) conduct applied to persons depending on their rank in society. Even crime and punishment was assessed in this way. The invention of citizenship rights in ancient Greece and Rome introduced uniform standards of conduct that applied across groups but these rights did not supplant prevailing privileges and burdens associated with the group rights and duties. “Natural law” conceptions of right developed by Stoic philosophers over two thousand years ago did indeed apply to individuals qua individuals, solely in virtue of their humanity. However, the tendency of these conceptions to level (or even eliminate) distinctions between master and slave, patrician and plebe,  did not jeopardize the system of group rights as such until the advent of the European Enlightenment in the late seventeenth century. The birth of nationalism and the push for democratic liberal reform in the early nineteenth century lent further impetus to the decline of aristocratic privileges based on birth. However, the spread of European colonialism in Africa and Asia again required the diplomatic recognition (and protection) of different ethnic and religious groups, protections that in some cases had been in effect for many years under the aegis of native governments. Group rights continued to play an important role in the Ottomon and Austro-Hungarian Empires until their dissolution at the conclusion of WWI. But the League of Nations' protection scheme for national minorities that was adopted in 1919  later presented Hitler with a pretext for militarily reincorporating territories occupied by irredentist (unassimilable) German nationals living in Czechoslovakia and Poland, a “protection” of national minorities that precipitated both a second world war and a holocaust. 
	Liberal democracies, of course, had their own problematic history of group-differentiated rights. The United States, the universally recognized leader of the “free world” at the end of WWII, was finally forced to confront its own legal form of racial segregation and discrimination during the Cold War. The civil rights movement that accompanied this confrontation presented itself as a struggle to extend universal human rights, now officially recognized by the United States and all signatory nations to the United Nations' ratification of the UDHR (1948), to blacks as individual placeholders of universal humanity rather than as members of a despised race. Since the movement made no distinction between racial and national (specifically indigenous) minorities, its equation of emancipation with integration and assimilation fully precluded any defense of group rights for the sake of preserving cultural groups.
	Since the seventies, however, liberals in the United States and Canada – not to mention liberals in France, Germany, Spain, and Italy – have been confronted with a number of recalcitrant indigenous, ethnic, and religious minorities who strongly reject the equation of emancipation and assimilation. Even the civil rights movement was forced to concede that race- and gender-blind anti-discrimination law was largely ineffectual apart from affirmative action and other group-based remedies. The resulting introduction of racial, ethnic, and gender classifications in statutory law was defended by its advocates as a departure from the old classifications that were intended to stigmatize women and minorities as inferiors; for here, differential treatment was justified as a temporary remedy for achieving the kind of integration and “sameness of treatment” that color- and gender-blind policies had failed to achieve.​[5]​ 
 
Categories of Group Rights

	In order to defend the use of special group protections, preferences, and exemptions within a liberal democracy that constitutionally upholds integration and equal treatment as the supreme law of the land, we must first examine the concept of group rights in more detail. Group rights come in many varieties. For the sake of simplicity we can distinguish between two broad categories of group rights: instrumentalist and collectivist. As noted above, some group-specific rights serve to protect more basic rights (human rights, constitutional rights, or statutory rights) that individuals possess as individuals. These instrumental group rights, which serve to protect individuals from discrimination, can be broken down into three categories. First, there are instrumental group rights, such as rights to bilingual education and affirmative action (see below), that enable members of disadvantaged or marginalized groups to assimilate into the mainstream. Although they function by granting differential entitlements, group rights of this nature are intended to be temporary and remedial and, most importantly, are oriented toward guaranteeing sameness of treatment for everyone, regardless of their individual or group-based differences. Second, there are instrumental rights, such as rights to  exemptions and other accommodations based on religion or moral conscience, that enable members of religious groups to practice their faith freely. Unlike the first class of instrumental group rights, this class of instrumental group rights is not aimed at assimilating marginalized groups into the mainstream so that their members will be treated the same way as everyone else. Instead, this second class of instrumental group rights is intended to protect the right to be different from the mainstream. Third, rights to political representation that give special political entitlements and protections to minorities (e.g., by guaranteeing them a certain number of legislative seats, a power of veto over certain kinds of legislation, and so on)  are supposed to ensure them an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice and influence legislation that significantly impacts their lives. This aim is neutral with respect to achieving assimilation or preserving difference and instead consists in providing a secondary political remedy for ensuring that discriminatory policies targeting minorities will not be enacted. 
	A collectivist group right, by contrast, preserves and protects the cultural identity of a group by permitting the group to limit the basic human, constitutional, or statutory rights of its own members to believe and behave as they individually think fit. These rights can be broken down into two categories. First, there are collectivist rights that directly limit the behavior of individual members. For instance, laws mandating that members of a cultural group speak a certain language or practice a certain religion enable the majority within that group to define the group's identity. Second, as in the case of instrumental group rights,  rights to special political representation are often demanded as a way of securing these collectivist rights.
	The above classification of group rights represents a cursory breakdown of the different aims and functions that group rights serve and so provides a glimpse of some of the complexities involved in discussing group rights. At the same time it oversimplifies these complexities and  for that reason cannot be regarded as exhaustive. For instance, it might be thought that immigrant groups and racial minorities typically demand instrumental rights in order to assimilate while religious and ethnic minorities demand instrumental rights in order to not assimilate. Again, it might be thought that indigenous peoples and national minorities typically demand collectivist and representation rights. But this simple correspondence of group and group right is somewhat premature. Indigenous peoples, for example, often claim both instrumentalist and collectivist group rights. They seek anti-discrimination protections for their individual members (including affirmative action preferences) while also seeking special rights to political representation and rights to  tribal self-determination. African Americans, too, have fused support for Black Nationalist educational programs with support for affirmative action placement and hiring and forms of race-conscious political representation.         

Preliminary Questions About Group Rights

Philosophers have questioned the legitimacy, if not coherence, of both instrumental and collectivist group rights. Do groups possess well-defined boundaries that enable the identification of their members? What conditions, for example, must be met before one can claim to be an African American who is eligible for preferential placement in law school? Do even well-defined groups possess the kind of unitary will or unitary interest base that would entitle them to claim a right? Assuming that these ontological questions are answered in the affirmative, one might ask whether there aren’t additional requirements of a moral nature that a group must satisfy in order to be a candidate for a group right protection. Can groups that have not experienced oppression claim special rights? Can groups that are intolerant of other groups do so? 
	Again, one might question whether instrumental group rights that aim to protect individual rights are properly designated as group rights. Perhaps the only genuine group rights – as distinct from differential rights that compensate for individuals’ group-related disadvantages - are collectivist rights that groups claim against their own members. The question then arises whether this limitation is morally defensible. Finally, one might question whether group rights must be legal rights rather than moral rights. Despite the fact that the most familiar group rights are legal rights - the group-based entitlements and duties of citizenship and of treaty-law, as well as the legal exemptions and preferences of civil rights law being cases in point - one might argue that certain groups have a moral right to preserve themselves which transcends and even limits the individual moral rights of their members. Beyond arguing that such preservation serves a higher-order moral good (in much the same way that preservation of the community or the state serves a higher order moral good) one might argue that not protecting a particular group renders individual members of that group more politically vulnerable. This argument, however, contravenes a venerable principle that moral rights essentially aim to protect the dignity and integrity of individuals against the overweening interference of the group to which they belong.​[6]​


Three General Attitudes Towards Group Rights

Broadly speaking, we can distinguish three positions regarding the soundness of group-specific rights: formalism, instrumentalism, and collectivism.  By formalism I mean the doctrine that law and morality must treat persons exactly the same way regardless of their particular differences. It therefore recognizes only individual rights. What I call instrumentalism, by contrast, holds that law and morality can sometimes treat persons differently, based on their personal, social, or group-based characteristics. Differential treatment is intended to compensate for handicaps that prevent persons from equally exercising their individual rights. The group-specific remedies instrumentalism recommends for protecting members of disadvantaged groups are therefore instrumental to securing their  individual rights and so cannot limit them. Collectivism rejects this last condition. It argues that groups can sometimes legitimately claim rights against their own individual members. 
	Formalism captures our belief in the fundamental moral equality of all human beings; all people deserve equal – here, meaning the same - consideration and treatment, regardless of their concrete differences. This ideal of equality is especially exemplified in the concept of human rights and in criminal law, where justice is said to be ‘blind’ to personal and social differences. 
	However, what appears to be true in the abstract appears false in the concrete. This is obviously the case in social, family, and civil law, where persons are treated differently depending on their personal, social, and group-based differences. Even criminal law allows consideration of differences when it treats minors and mentally handicapped persons charged with crimes differently from normal functioning adults. Sentencing guidelines – especially when they permit victim impact statements as well as statements regarding mitigating factors favoring the defendant – allow particularities of social background to affect the jury’s or judge’s deliberations. Rape shield laws that specifically protect woman (but not men) as well as statutes criminalizing abortion may be said to have a group-specific ‘disproportionate impact’ built into them.
	A rigid defender of formalism might argue that the above instances of differential legal treatment are morally wrong because they violate the ideal of moral equality. Different treatment, it is argued, is preferential or discriminatory treatment, and so is incompatible with showing equal moral respect (or providing equal legal protection) for all. This is precisely the objection leveled against affirmative action programs in the United States. However, most formalists allow that under some circumstances different treatment is necessary in order to ensure equal treatment.  Exempting conscientious objectors  from military service protects their equal freedom of religion and conscience; entitling profoundly disabled persons to access special benefits protects their equal right to live and participate in the social life of the community; and targeting oppressed minorities in recruiting prospective employees for governmentally funded jobs and professional schools protects their equal right against discrimination. Furthermore, as I noted above, short of endorsing a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship under one world government,  the moral equality of human beings qua human must be institutionally embodied at the level of the nation, in which the content of moral equality will be defined differently, from nation to nation.​[7]​

	

The Ontological Objection to Group Rights


I will assume that instrumental group rights are not inherently morally objectionable. Before examining whether collectivist group rights also satisfy this condition, we must address two ontological objections to the general concept of group rights. First, it can be doubted whether there are any well-defined groups of individuals of the sort that an ascription of a group right presupposes. Second, it can be doubted whether groups as such possess the necessary ontological conditions that enable them to claim a right or possess a right by virtue of some common will or interest.
	The first objection fails when we consider groups whose boundaries are defined by legal stipulation. Persons entitled to special rights in virtue of their membership in income- or age- groups fall within this category. However, the claim that the problem of group identity can be resolved by legal stipulation is still question-begging, since the question is whether such stipulated identities can be philosophically justifiable. This objection proves especially powerful when considering groups whose boundaries cannot be so stipulated. Racial groups are intransigent in this regard. The definition of race provided by the infamous “one drop” rule prevalent in the U.S. during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century was based on bad science and could not in any case be applied since persons could “pass” as more than one racial type according to a competing phenotypical understanding of racial categories. Modern genetics provides some help in tracing genealogies of group descent but race and ethnic categories do not map onto genes and phenotypes. The widely accepted view that these categories are socially constructed and political would seem to exacerbate the problem of identification further. Even if such categories have real, objective purchase on the way in which people actually understand themselves and relate to others, the “underlying reality” may belie their real force and efficacy, as postmodernists and poststructuralists have argued. In short, it may be plausibly argued that these ethno-racial categories for delineating groups simply conceal the irreducible individuality, plurality, and heterogeneity of human forms of life behind the facade of fictive labels, thereby casting aspersions on the ontological identity of groups as such.​[8]​ 
	Unless the criteria stipulated for defining a group by ascription can be applied, membership in the group cannot be reliably determined. But many groups are not defined by third-person ascription but by first-person attachments and identifications, which would appear to simplify the assignment of group membership. To be sure, this apparent advantage in simplicity presumes that subjective (first-person) identifications are more  reliable (accurate) and legitimate than third-person ascriptions. But why should a man man who is judged by all commonly accepted criteria to be “white” but who nonetheless insists on being classified as “black” (and who,we shall assume, genuinely thinks he is black) be eligible for an affirmative action preference? Furthermore, even if we should accept first-person identifications as authoritative for determining membership in a group, it is hardly clear what this means. Should unreflected and otherwise socially constrained self-identifications be judged as reliable as identifications that are reflected and totally voluntary? A person can ‘identify’ with a group into which he or she had little choice in joining, either because he or she was born into it or acquired it by way of customary ascription​[9]​  Such is the case with groups associated with ethnicity, religion (often ‘inherited’ from parents), gender, race, and perhaps sexual orientation. In these cases, first-person identification – often tacit, weak, and unexpressed – provides an unreliable basis for defining group membership.
 The situation improves somewhat if the identification in question is entirely voluntary and explicitly expressed, as when a person expressly votes for a particular party that represents the interests of a particular group, or when a person voluntarily resides within a religious community or officially converts from one religion to another. Still, the voluntary nature of group ascription does not necessarily ease the problem of delimiting a group’s boundaries.  As the recent hubbub over the U.S. census form shows, the tendency in today’s liberal multicultural societies to treat ethno-racial identification as a matter of personal choice has not been favorably received by all ethno-racial minorities.​[10]​ 
	The second ontological challenge to group rights questions whether groups – as distinct from individual persons – can be the sorts of entities to which one can meaningfully ascribe rights.  For simplicity, let me clarify this problem by focusing on two major ways of thinking about rights. The first way, which descends from the social contract tradition, views rights as claims that arise, in the first place, by mutual agreement, as an outcome of will.  The second way, which descends from utilitarianism, views rights as goods designating basic interests.​[11]​ 
	Both views have their advantages and disadvantages. The will-theory (contract-inspired) view of rights would appear to deny rights to animals, children, and mentally handicapped persons. At best, one might say that these 'persons' hold their rights ‘virtually’ insofar as their caretakers can claim these rights on their behalf. But this suggests that their right to claim them in this way must be based on some prior good,  interest, or vital capability. In this case it would be possession of a basic good, interest, or capability that would be the basis for ascribing rights so that claiming a right would be subsequent to and supervenient upon this possession. Be that as it may, it seems equally incontestable that rights – whatever their grounds for attribution- also designate demands or claims that one agent can bring against another (despite the fact that, as the UDHR Preamble rightly notes,  human rights also designate standards of progress and civilization that are continually evolving). 
	We need not resolve the debate over the ontology of rights in order to ask whether groups can be said to possess a ‘will’ or a ‘common interest.’ Contrary to the formalist objection, some groups are capable of claiming rights. I am thinking, of course, of formally organized groups who possess a legal charter or constitution, such as corporations, that have a well-defined chain of command and decision-making. Leaving aside the fact that corporations often possess an organizational and volitional complexity  that blurs the lines of corporate responsibility and so weakens the extent to which they exhibit will and personality – a complexity that is rendered all the more recalcitrant to reductive, unitary accounts of will and personality when the model of the corporation is extended to include stakeholding conceptions that bring to the fore divided wills that cannot always be legally harmonized – it can nonetheless be asserted that corporations possess considerably more cohesion than a mere ‘aggregate’ or ‘collection’ of strangers (Sartre’s famous example of persons queuing up at a bus stop comes to mind). 
	But most groups that claim rights possess a middle range of volitional personality. The transition from an aggregate to an assertive group with personality – which roughly coincides with Marx’s famous distinction (of Hegelian provenance) between a class existing ‘in itself’ (a group of persons who have yet to consciously identify with one another as sharing politically salient interests) and a class existing ‘for itself’ (the same group who has expressly recognized itself as possessing such interests) -  is historically well documented. Sartre’s famous example of an disorganized rabble of sans culottes spontaneously ‘fusing’ into an army possessing leadership and will as they storm the Bastille illustrates how quickly groups can be infused with identity and purpose, become politically solidified through internal monitoring and enforcement, and then degenerate once again into bureaucratically ossified ‘series’ of alienated units who no longer express their common will through anything resembling a process of voluntary consent.​[12]​
	The interesting question is whether members of aggregate groups that lack a sense of their own will and identity can claim group-specific rights. If we adopt the interest-conception theory of rights, we can scarcely deny that they can. Just how ‘common’ such interests must be and how consciously those who ostensibly possess them must also assert them is disputable, however. Children are ascribed common interests that they would scarcely affirm as their own (such as the interest in education, healthy diet, and so on); these interests, in turn, are often the basis for assigning them group-specific rights to schooling, nutritional, and health benefits denied to adults.  Women and members of a racial minority who may not be unified in consciously affirming a common group interest may still merit certain group-based rights. Even when the only common interest that might be attributed to members of these groups is an interest in not being discriminated against, a special group right to so-called descriptive political representation can still be justified. For it can be argued that the mere symbolic (token) presence of a woman or minority government officer acts to diminish the harm in question, quite apart from his or her active representation of a common interest or policy (as distinct from a common perspective, say). Indeed, such rights to descriptive representation can be justified as a pre-emptive measure even after discrimination has abated and the groups in question has reverted to a less politically organized, aggregate status.​[13]​ 

   
Groups and Rights: A Response to the Moral Objection

Let us assume that objections to a group’s ontological worthiness for possessing rights are met. If a group claims a moral right to preserve its identity against the changeable views and practices of its own members, then the objection immediately arises that no group obviously has that kind of right. However, one reason for thinking that it might is that the preservation of cultural identity is an intrinsic human good which is necessary for the enjoyment of other goods, including the robust exercise of free choice based on what Charles Taylor calls “strong evaluations,” or evaluations based on an appeal to higher-order culturally-defined conceptions of the good life.
	 One version of this argument – call it the socio-biological argument – holds that cultural groups have a right to preserve themselves because doing so advances cultural diversity, which is necessary for the flourishing (if not continued existence) of the human species. Because cultural groups pass down unique ways of adapting to the world that are analogous to the unique ways in which organisms adapt to their environment, cultural diversity, so it is argued, is just as essential to adaptation as is biodiversity. 
Even if cultural diversity were essential to the flourishing (or preservation) of the human species – a fact that cannot be empirically demonstrated – it is far from obvious that it is best promoted by preserving the cultural identity of groups against changes provoked by interactions with other groups. Leaving aside the difficulty (not to mention moral dubiousness) of policing individuals’ choices regarding which groups they choose to identify and interact with,​[14]​ it may actually be the case – counterintuitive though it may seem -  that cultural diversity thrives only when such changes are allowed to occur. Cultural groups typically preserve themselves in the same way that organisms do: by changing themselves to meet environmental challenges.​[15]​    One such challenge occurs when native cultural traditions have fallen into a state of internal crisis. In this case,  resolving the crisis my require the culture in question to learn from another culture.​[16]​
 Ideally it might seem that this learning process should be mutual and equal, so that no culture (or cultural group) comes to dominate any other culture (or cultural group). No cultural group, we might think, should assimilate all other cultural groups. However, even when such assimilation occurs the result is often dynamic and generative of new cultural forms. In any case the extinction of a cultural group by no means spells the end of its cultural ideas, as evidenced by the global dissemination of Christianity and other artifacts of Roman provenance.
	Notwithstanding these facts, the waning of a cultural group undoubtedly poses political and – one might say, moral - risks to its members, especially if the process of assimilation or dissolution is sudden. Advocates of Deaf Culture who argue that widespread implantation of cochlear hearing aids amounts to cultural genocide may be chided for over-exaggeration, but there can be little doubt that the rapid advance of cochlear implantation techniques – followed by the rapid decline of persons identifying as members of the deaf community – will mean less political clout for that community, and therefore less capacity to combat discrimination targeting the deaf. This moral vulnerability would still exist even if sign language survived as a ‘dead’ language. 
	It is this kind of argument, which appeals to the moral harm that cultural disintegration poses to the individual members of a cultural group, that would have to be marshaled to support the right of the group in question to preserve itself. This argument, however, would only be necessary, but not sufficient, for establishing at best a prima facie (or qualified) case for such a right. 
	Before discussing what additional arguments would have to be made for establishing this right, let me briefly address the arguments that would have to be made for a less sweeping group right of the sort typically advanced on instrumentalist, rather than collectivist, grounds. Instrumentalist group rights aim to protect individuals against discrimination. Hence, in order to justify an instrumentalist group right for a particular group it must first be shown that its individual members are presently discriminated against on the basis of their group identity. Second, it must be shown that effectively mitigating such discrimination requires endowing these individuals with a special group right.
	The history of civil rights law in the U.S. shows how these considerations come into play. During the sixties and seventies, the U.S. federal government enacted civil rights laws designed to protect blacks, women, and other selected minorities from discrimination. These laws proved inadequate because they required that plaintiffs provide documentary evidence demonstrating the discriminatory intent of defendants. They also proved inadequate in dealing with institutional (or unintended) discrimination. In some cases, defendants did not intentionally discriminate for prejudicial reasons, but simply did what was most expedient – hiring, promoting, or placing people who were closest to them geographically, culturally, socially, physically and (presumably) psychologically. In these cases, under-representation of women and minorities was attributed to institutional and structural factors reflecting the legacy of past – but not necessarily present - discrimination.
Affirmative action was the name given to a set of policies – ranging from active recruitment to hiring and placement quotas – designed especially to combat unintended, institutional discrimination on the part of employers and institutions of higher education that received government money. By the late seventies affirmative action preferences were being attacked (rightly or wrongly) for violating the rights of white males to equal treatment and for being ineffective. Finally, alternative remedies for combating institutional discrimination that were adopted in the nineties suggested that affirmative action policies might not have been as necessary as their proponents had once claimed. 
The use of race-conscious methods in redrawing congressional voting districts in the eighties and nineties displays the same set of considerations exemplified in affirmative action. The question was whether a pattern of racially polarized voting obtained that prevented racial minorities from electing representatives of their choice. The debate that ensued revolved around whether redrawing selected voting districts in order to ensure that minorities were the majority in these districts effectively enabled them to elect representatives of their choice, and did so, moreover, in a way that no race-blind remedy could.       	   
	          
	The moral conditions mentioned above that attach to the instrumental use of group-specific protections and preferences correspond to the minimal legal conditions for granting instrumental group rights.  Such protections and preferences must be shown to be necessary in light of the ineffectiveness of non-group-specific alternatives.  Other moral conditions attach to the character of the group itself. In particular, groups whose members are intolerant of outsiders and espouse racist, sexist, and ethno-centrist views are less deserving of group rights protection. 
 Determining which groups merit a loss of preference or protection, however, is a political challenge that admits of no easy solution. Religious groups pose a special challenge to liberal democracies.  Constitutionally, such regimes must not impair freedom of religious conscience by burdening religious groups with regulations that apply in a general way to all groups and individuals; yet exempting such groups from regulation appears to violate the very impartiality of the law. The tension is perhaps greatest when considering regimes that are founded on an opposition between national esprit du corps and religion, as witnessed by the recent turmoil over Muslim women wearing headscarves in public places in France. In constitutional regimes that have some entanglement, short of establishment, with religion (Germany, Canada, and the United States provide tax exemptions and some tax revenues to religious organizations), the tension is no less acute.  Why should Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina lose its tax-exempt status as a religious institution of higher learning by prohibiting interracial dating while the Catholic Church, which bans women from becoming priests, retain it? That Bob Jones University was not complying with the spirit and intent of the Civil Rights Act, which equates racial separation with racist stigma, seems clear. Although the same could have been said of the Catholic Church’s ban on women priests during the days when it officially endorsed the inferiority of women, it cannot be said of the Church today. Unfortunately, the neat logic underlying the law’s different treatment of Bob Jones University and the Catholic Church is not available to us in dealing with a host of other issues, including gay rights. Should persons who find homosexuality abhorrent for religious reasons be compelled by law to rent to homosexuals or should they be granted a group right exempting them from this provision? 
	Two additional questions arise when considering the moral worthiness of a group to merit a collectivist group right.  First, one might object that no group whose very identity was constituted by another group, through acts of domination and coercion, deserves to be preserved. Because racial identity fits this description it might be thought that racial groups should not be preserved and that the proper policy in dealing with them is racial integration. Yet in the US some blacks (above all Black Muslims and Black nationalists) oppose integration. They rightly argue that black racial identity has become a mark of pride and solidarity among many Africa Americans rather than the stigma of inferiority blackness once invoked. They also argue (again rightly) that integration will spell the end of African American communities and their distinctive, geographically- bounded cultural institutions.  Although members of these groups may want instrumental group rights (affirmative action) that enable them to overcome racial discrimination in education and employment, they may also want collectivist group rights aimed at preserving the group and guaranteeing political representation. (Among the collectivist group rights they might lobby for are rights to special schools providing Afro-centric education and rights to special school districts.)
	The use of group rights to preserve racial groups is doubtless more problematic than the use of such rights to preserve ethnic or religious groups if for no other reason than that race is a false biological ideology that was imposed on racial minorities by Europeans and their North American counterparts to ensure their domination.​[17]​  And it is largely racism that explains the continued existence of a segregated and marginalized African American community, culture, and identity today. On the other hand, it can be argued that free acceptance – not imposition – best describes the attitude of most contemporary blacks to their racial identity. In any case, religious groups and ethnic sub-nationalities also had their identities forged through complex acts of imposition and exclusion and no one denies their legitimacy, so the mere fact of imposition and exclusion, it might be argued, ought not to count against the legitimacy of racial groups. 
	A second objection against collectivist group rights – that such rights permit the majority (or a dominant minority) within the group to impose a distinctive community, culture, and identity on the group’s own members - is harder to dispel. Here, the moral legitimacy of the group hinges on the extent to which rank-and-file members exercise some (preferably democratic) influence in shaping it. Not only must each member have a real opportunity to contribute in this endeavor but each must be capable of doing so with a modicum of reflection. In other words, it’s not enough that individual members contribute by passively (habitually) imbibing and passing down the group’s cultural ethos; they must also do so with the knowledge that other real possibilities for constituting this ethos exist. So, even if the members initially come to identify with the group unreflectively and unfreely in the course of socialization, they should later come to identify with it reflectively.​[18]​


The Right to Exit


Connected to the above condition, which presumes that one's membership in and allegiance to a group that limits one's freedom is reflective rather than habitually constrained, is the condition that one be free to exit the group without suffering undue hardship. Freedom to exit depends on the group making this a viable option for its members. Several examples illustrate the importance of this condition. Denying cochlear implants to young congenitally deaf children – the position defended by advocates of Deaf Culture – preserves deaf community against the danger of assimilation at the expense of withdrawing an exit option for these children, who show poor rates of success in mastering written and spoken language. Allowing Amish parents  to remove their children from school at the age of fourteen so that they can fill their proper role within the Amish community preserves Amish community by denying their children exposure to different lifestyles as well as the technical and civic skills they would need to succeed in the outside world, thereby also denying them a robust exit option.​[19]​
	What makes these cases so difficult is that the right to exit, while not being  denied outright – the Amish practice of forcing young adults to leave the community for one year so that they can decide “on their own” whether to return to the community as “permanent” residents expressly endorses this right – cannot be robustly exercised for lack of supporting conditions. Of course, being born into any group constrains our options to exit that group in the future. I may have to learn a new language and undergo re-acculturation if I choose to emigrate to a foreign country. I may have to undergo sex-change surgery and gender-reassignment training if I want to become a member of a different sex/gender group than the one nature and socialization imposed on me; I may have to undergo cosmetic surgery if I want to become (or “pass”) as a member of a different race than the one my society currently ascribes to me. In general, however, it is easier (in terms of possessing the requisite competence, if not the psychological disposition) to alter one's physical appearance than it is to be “born again” into a new cultural identity; and it is easier to be re-socialized than to acquire a basic capability for choosing (or communicating). 
	Assessing the degree to which a group's practices cross the threshold from constraining a right to exit to effectively denying it will require looking carefully at the extent to which the practices in question deny the development of a basic competence requisite for freedom of choice. We may be inclined to think that the denial of cochlear implantation crosses that line by imposing a natural “disability” while socialization into a narrow culture whose power over the individual is reinforced by great social pressure does not.
	Even when the preconditions for robustly exercising an exit option are present the psychological costs of doing so may be prohibitive. These costs limit the use of this option in resolving conflicts between groups and dissident minorities. While the option  seems to offer an attractive solution for resolving conflicts between minority dissidents and dominant majorities within confessional religious orders, the psychological costs of exiting a religious community can be extreme. Thus, while it might seem natural for evangelical Christian dissidents of traditional indigenous communities to leave these communities – thereby preserving both their right to proselytize and the right of the community to practice its traditional religion without interference – the costs associated with uprooting oneself from the community of one's ancestors may be prohibitive. In cases like this, the only workable solution seems to be mutual accommodation or compromise, where one or both sides voluntarily consent(s) to limit the exercise of their rights.

Conclusion

	To summarize: I have argued that both instrumentalist as well as collectivist group rights may be morally justifiable. Instrumentalist group rights are easiest to defend because they do not necessarily conflict with the equal exercise of individual rights and, indeed, are expressly promoted for this very purpose.  Collectivist group rights, by contrast, do conflict with the exercise of individual rights and so their defense is conditional on the satisfaction of additional ontological and moral factors. Since these rights aim to protect the beliefs, practices, and identities of groups against the subversive actions of their own individual members – which to the dominant majority within the group appear to be indistinguishable from intolerant acts undertaken by outsiders – we must first assume that these collective beliefs, practices, and identities are freely and reflectively endorsed by the majority and not merely imposed on them by a ruling elite (through techniques of brainwashing and other forms of coercive mind-control). Second, said beliefs, practices, and identities must meet a threshold of civility and tolerance with respect to the beliefs, practices, and identities of other groups that meet this same threshold. Groups do not merit moral or legal recognition that fail to meet this expectation.
	 In response to the question why groups merit collectivist group rights in the first place, the answer is  that individuals suffer (avoidable) and considerable harm when the community in which they belong declines in numbers and diminishes in political influence. The harm in question need not take the form of invidious discrimination (or a civil rights violation) which might be remedied by individually tailored civil rights protection or instrumentalist group protection. It suffices that the harm in question seriously imperils the group members' sense of self by robbing them of a source of social recognition and self-determination. As communitarians rightly point out, our sense of security depends upon our belonging to particular groups of persons who care about us deeply and on whom we can rely – not as a stranger cares about (relies on) a stranger but as a kinsman cares about (relies on) a kinsman. 
	A more difficult question is whether this line of reasoning justifies the right of a dominant social group to preserve its demographic and political advantage against less dominant groups. The example of immigration is instructive in this regard. Can a dominant group of European-descended people in the United States seek to preserve its identity (if one can call it that) by controlling the flow of immigration from Latin America?​[20]​ Few would deny that it has a right to maintain the integrity of its political order by insisting that immigrants at least teach their children the dominant language of the land (English). Too much cultural fragmentation, especially along linguistic lines, can be – although as the example of Canada, China, India, Belgium, Switzerland, and  South Africa amply attest, need not be – antagonistic to the political integrity of a nation.  But the right to preserve the linguistic identity of one's country, whether defensible or not, falls considerably short of the right to preserve the identity of white, European (or Anglo-Saxon) culture. Liberal multicultural democracies that depend on immigration are morally committed by their very constitutions to be non-exclusionary in this respect.  Furthermore, it goes without saying that they are committed to respecting the universal human rights of desperate foreigners to asylum and refuge, regardless of their racial and cultural identity.​[21]​ 
	 By contrast, indigenous peoples and indeed any nation with a special identity as a sanctuary for an oppressed  religious minority (as in the case of Israel) may indeed have a right to grant preferential treatment to just those immigrants who identify with the thick, cultural identity of the dominant group (or belong to that group, according to criteria determined by the majority).​[22]​  That said, collectivist group rights are more straightforwardly defensible when they are expressly tailored to protecting  minority cultural groups from being assimilated into the mainstream within a larger society.​[23]​ 
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